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[Submitted on 31 Aug 2026] Title:Lensless Gaze Is Not Private by Default: Auditing Identity Leakage Across Disclosure Surfaces View a PDF of the paper titled Lensless Gaze Is Not Private by Default: Auditing Identity Leakage Across Disclosure Surfaces, by Rahul Vimalkanth and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Lensless near-eye sensing is often described as privacy-friendly because its coded measurements are visually unintelligible. Yet visual unintelligibility reflects human interpretation, not what a learned adversary can recover. We therefore treat identity privacy as a systems property of disclosure surfaces: representations crossing sensing, storage, computation, and output boundaries. We audit a simulated lensless gaze pipeline under a 36-subject known-gallery closed-set identification protocol with a fixed, known PSF; privacy from an unknown or varying optical key is outside our scope. Reported accuracies are empirical attack success rates under matched linear and MLP probes and do not upper-bound stronger adversaries. Simulated lensless measurements yield 96.7% top-1 identification versus 97.7% for matched original eye crops, while an MAE embedding retains 94.3%. Compression alone offers little protection: 8-D PCA and a matched 8-D bottleneck retain 93.2% and 91.8%, whereas separately trained 8-D GSPL bottlenecks yield 77.5% mean recovery across three seeds. A released 128-way gaze token lowers single-frame recovery to 38.1%, while its residual and continuous gaze output expose 62.1% and 72.6%, respectively. Under a source-frame-disjoint tiled protocol, token summaries reach 39.9% at T=25, showing that repeated-output risk depends on representation and aggregation. These rates reflect all subject-correlated information in the evaluated dataset, including acquisition and behavioral cues, rather than isolating intrinsic ocular biometrics. Ordinary least squares residualization against a six-dimensional crop geometry and intensity summary still leaves lensless recovery at 95.1%. Our results show that privacy claims for lensless sensing must be tested at disclosure boundaries rather than inferred from appearance. Comments: 16 pages, 5 figures. Accepted at the PFATCV Workshop, ECCV 2026. Code available at this https URL Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) Cite as: arXiv:2609.09188 [cs.CV] (or arXiv:2609.09188v1 [cs.CV] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.09188 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Rahul Vimalkanth [view email] [v1] Mon, 31 Aug 2026 19:31:01 UTC (22,804 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Lensless Gaze Is Not Private by Default: Auditing Identity Leakage Across Disclosure Surfaces, by Rahul Vimalkanth and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.CV new | recent | 2026-09 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Loading... Data provided by: Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)