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When Does Information Sharing Improve Decentralized Discovery? Aggregation, Independent Rescue, and Equilibrium Selection

Summary

This paper uses exact finite models to separate two effects of information sharing: aggregation improves pooled estimates but can crowd out independent rescue actions. It derives an exact condition for when a sharing step improves discovery and shows in a two-agent Bayesian game that the result depends on equilibrium selection rather than being universal.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Yohei Nakajima
When Does Information Sharing Improve Decentralized Discovery? Aggregation, Independent Rescue, and Equilibrium Selection
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[Submitted on 1 Sep 2026]

Title:When Does Information Sharing Improve Decentralized Discovery? Aggregation, Independent Rescue, and Equilibrium Selection

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Abstract:Information sharing can improve a pooled estimate while eliminating independent rescue actions. This paper separates those effects in exact finite discovery models. A centralized action-budget profile shows that equal one-person accuracy can coexist with different portfolio values. Under a registered incremental-sharing protocol, a sharing step improves discovery exactly when pooled residual error contracts faster than an independent rescue attempt. Exact bounded registries exhibit compression, aggregation, neutral curves, and a bounded zero mixed class. In a two-agent Bayesian game with a hidden mixture of common and independent signal sources, the registered selected equilibrium yields a strict positive sharing interval at signal accuracy 3/5, while alternative equilibria show that the result is selection-dependent rather than universal. The models are synthetic and finite; no human or organizational data are used.

Comments: working paper; deterministic source package; exact bounded evidence

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)

Cite as: arXiv:2609.01814 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.01814v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.01814

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Yohei Nakajima [view email] [v1] Tue, 1 Sep 2026 19:41:30 UTC (102 KB)

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Key points and analysis

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Key points

  • A sharing step improves discovery exactly when pooled residual error contracts faster than an independent rescue attempt.
  • Equal one-person accuracy can coexist with different portfolio values, as shown by a centralized action-budget profile.
  • In a two-agent game at signal accuracy 3/5, the registered selected equilibrium yields a strict positive sharing interval, while alternative equilibria show selection dependence.
  • The models are synthetic and finite; no human or organizational data are used.

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