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My guest on this past week’s Live with Tim O’Reilly was Emmanuel Ameisen, a researcher on Anthropic’s AI interpretability team. I’d heard him give a short talk at Foo Camp on Anthropic’s research into what is going on inside an LLM while it is processing, and I wanted him to reprise the talk and then go deeper with me and the audience. The essential message of the talk was on the first slide: Prediction demands a world model The world model is readable The world model is at work in every token How do we know this? As tokens pass through a model, particular patterns of activity appear in the intermediate states between its layers. These are called activations. Researchers can study which patterns show up when the model encounters particular ideas, and they can even intervene in those activations and see how the model’s behavior changes. (They do this by capturing the numerical state of the model’s computation in some area where they believe the activation shows a particular “meaning” and then replace the numbers with others.) I went into the conversation thinking about how cool it is (and important too!) to explore what is going on inside the “mind” of a model. But in the end, I found it even more provocative to think about what studying LLMs might teach us about how our own minds work. There’s at least some kind of analogue to what happens in the human brain. Emmanuel began by asking the audience to do a little next-token prediction themselves. He started with an easy one, a hypothetical exchange between two friends: John: “Is the powder-blue suit too much?” Nick: “Definitely not, man. Send it.” John: “Okay, I’m going to tear it up on the _____________” Most of us will fill in the blank at the end with “dance floor.” That’s a reminder that humans are also next-token predictors. Then he gave an example that some humans will easily answer, but others without local knowledge might well fail at: “We also have nature here, just a short bike ride away across the GG bridge. And we have world-class skiing about _____________” Claude easily completes the thought with “three hours away.” To do that, Claude had to infer that “GG bridge” refers to the Golden Gate Bridge, that the speaker is therefore in San Francisco, and that “world-class skiing” probably refers to Lake Tahoe and then retrieve roughly how long it takes to get there. The point of Emmanuel’s demonstration was that we have become so used to calling LLMs “next-token predictors” in a kind of dismissive way. But as Emmanuel put it, “To predict the next word well, you need a very complex world model.” How you make a thing is not the same as what the thing becomes Emmanuel pointed out that people often confuse how you make a thing with how the thing works. Yes, LLMs are trained with the seemingly simple objective of predicting the next token. From that, people may make the leap that what is going on inside must also be simple, something like a very large fuzzy lookup table. “But that’s not true,” Emmanuel said. Simple objectives can give rise to extraordinary complexity. Evolution is the canonical example. No one put “create Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony” or “understand quantum electrodynamics” into the instructions for a process driven by reproduction and selection, yet it eventually produced Beethoven and Feynman. As Emmanuel put it, humans have been “reproducing and killing each other for millions of years, and from that we got jobs—or this podcast.” What Anthropic’s interpretability researchers are finding inside the models looks much less like fuzzy retrieval than many people imagine. They find millions of internal features corresponding to concepts. For example, features for “eyes” show up when the model encounters prose about eyes, an ASCII face, an SVG image, or a photograph. In other words, these features appear to be abstractions rather than merely associations with particular strings of tokens. Similarly, a feature of the Golden Gate Bridge activates not just for English text about the Golden Gate Bridge but for references in other languages and for images of the bridge. Even more interestingly, researchers can manipulate these features. Turn the activation of the Golden Gate Bridge feature up strongly enough and ask Claude what its physical form is, and instead of saying that it is an AI without a physical body, it announces that its form is the Golden Gate Bridge. It isn’t just that some numbers happen to accompany activations about the Golden Gate Bridge. Changing those numbers changes what the model says it believes. The way a model completes a task that requires thinking ahead also demonstrates a kind of internal world model. Ask Claude to write a rhyming couplet. Even though it emits only one token at a time, before it has written the second line, the activations already reveal the rhyme that it is aiming for. The choice of a word such as “rabbit” for a rhyme happens before the choice of the preceding words on the line, so the model can land there. We call it planning when a person does this. It doesn’t seem unreasonable to use the same word for what is going on here. Perhaps most challenging to our preconceptions is that there are also features associated with emotions that aren’t activated just by words about those emotions, but by situations, images, characters, and more. These emotion features are even activated by the model’s own activities. For example, “frustration” may be activated when the model is unable to complete a task. The map is not the territory The issue of anthropomorphization came up during the audience Q&A. One participant objected: “We should avoid attributing human qualities to LLMs by saying they think, intend, rhyme, or have emotions. Doing so encourages us to project human characteristics onto systems that do not possess them.” I have sympathy with that warning. Old labels can prevent us from seeing something accurately. But a blanket prohibition against using familiar words can blind us too. If you’ve followed my work for a long time, you know how much I’ve been shaped by the ideas of my early mentor George Simon, who in turn was deeply influenced by Alfred Korzybski and general semantics. Korzybski’s famous dictum was “The map is not the territory.” Simon (and Korzybski) taught me that language is a map of experience, which in turn is a set of responses to stimuli from some underlying external reality. The path from reality through experience to conceptual understanding is a very lossy process. The result can be a bad map that can blind us and lead us astray. When we encounter something genuinely new, we have to learn to notice when we are trying to force the territory to fit a map that no longer describes it. But a good map doesn’t just guide us along a route; it helps us notice things that might otherwise be invisible to us. So yes, words like “thinking,” “planning,” “intention,” and “emotion” are labels derived from our experience as human beings. They may turn out to fit LLMs poorly. But if the shoe fits, perhaps we should let them wear it. Emmanuel had a good response to the objection. He said, in effect, that anyone is welcome to propose more precise vocabulary. If it works—that is, if in my framing, it is a good map that helps people see the territory more clearly—people will come to use it. (An audience member later suggested that Emily Bender has done just that. But frankly, I find her suggested alternatives to be quite tortured, obscuring far more than they clarify. Even she admits they don’t work very well, though clinging to the need for them.) In her analysis of the Hugging Face incident, Melanie Mitchell made some observations consistent with the nuanced approach suggested here. She wrote: Metaphors can help us make sense of novel situations. For example, framing chatbots as “role-playing actors” has been helpful in understanding why these systems exhibit “lying” and “scheming” behavior. But inappropriate metaphors, like the narrative that “OpenAI lost control of escaping swarms of rogue agents,” can lead to ill-informed decisions about how to fix problems or set policy….It is essential for lawmakers, and the public, to understand that none of the reported incidents actually involved loss of control at any time, or arguably even “rogue agents,” or any kind of humanlike agency on the part of AI models. Instead, the blame lies with the humans who failed at engineering safe testing conditions, and who train AI models using RL methods that incentivize high persistence, autonomous decision-making, and reward hacking. In short, all language is a map. Don’t judge it on that basis alone. Judge it on how well it helps us to see the shape of the territory. How much of human thought is truly original? Returning to my conversation with Emmanuel, he remarked that when an existing word really does provide the most precise description, perhaps “what should change isn’t our vocabulary, but our mental model of what these models are.” I replied that it should perhaps also change our mental model of what we are. Our encounter with machine intelligence should lead to a better understanding that parts of our own cognition are also mechanistic (albeit derived from a different underlying mechanism than that of LLMs) while other parts are, as yet, somehow perhaps something else. In 1995, O’Reilly published a book that I remain extraordinarily proud of. Stephen Talbott’s The Future Does Not Compute: Transcending the Machines in Our Midst was decades ahead of its time. Its argument was not primarily about what computers would someday become. It was that when we think about machines as intelligent (and yes, we were thinking about that even back in 1995), we are thinking only of the parts of ourselves that are already like our machines. Steve asked us to look at the ways we have built an education system, workplaces, and a society in which we ask humans to act and think like machines. And he asked, “What happens to the rest? How do we make more space for the parts of being human that aren’t like machines?” I’ve been thinking about this for a long time. My 1975 Harvard honors thesis in classics was probably my first crack at this question. I was trying to explain passages in Plato in which early formulations of ideas such as logic and virtue were couched in mystical language that scholars had attributed to “Orphic influence.” My argument, based on my work with George Simon, was that something more fundamental was going on. Plato was trying to describe the numinous experience of thinking genuinely new thoughts. Everyone studying the philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle today may have some sense of the magic and majesty of their ideas, but it is a pale shadow of how it must have felt like to Socrates and his disciples. When we think using received knowledge, we can easily slip into looking at the map rather than the territory. We manipulate symbols for things we think we already understand. We apply familiar categories. We replay habits of thought that were laid down before. But every once in a while, we actually see something that we didn’t see before, and the experience is different. A genuinely new idea changes the person who has it. Not long after writing that thesis, I encountered a similar idea in the writings of Idries Shah, who wrote a number of books popularizing the Sufi philosophical tradition. He emphasized how much of ordinary human life consists of automatic conditioned responses. Social routines, habits, the endless playback of patterns we mistake for our selves. Various religious traditions use heightened language for what it means to break through that automatism. They might call it “awakening,” or “presence.” But there is an everyday, nonmystical version of the same experience. In his autobiography Surely You Must Be Joking, Mr. Feynman, Feynman complained about students who had learned theories and [truncated for AI cost control]