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Rational Use of Time for Social Coordination in Humans and AI

Summary

A new study uses a cooperative card game, The Mind, which forbids explicit communication, to compare how 150 humans and two classes of AI models (computer-use agents and standard text-prompted LLMs) coordinate using only temporal signals. Human behavior is best captured by a Bayesian strategy that infers a partner's belief from timing, and frontier models show similar patterns. However, unlike humans, none of the tested models efficiently adapt their behavior to partners over the course of the game. The findings suggest humans perform implicit probabilistic reasoning about continuous-time signals in dynamic social settings, and such mechanisms may emerge without real-time experience.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Xiulin Yang, Sirisha Gudavalli, Jennifer Hu
Rational Use of Time for Social Coordination in Humans and AI
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[Submitted on 10 Nov 2026]

Title:Rational Use of Time for Social Coordination in Humans and AI

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Abstract:All social interactions are situated in time. Previous studies have shown that humans are able to use implicit temporal cues, such as the duration of a pause, to infer others' mental states. But how do humans use temporal cues for dynamic, fine-grained social coordination? And can AI systems do the same, without ``experiencing'' continuous real-time as humans do? We study these questions using a cooperative card game task called The Mind, which requires players to achieve a shared goal across repeated interactions but forbids explicit communication: the only available signal is the passage of time. We evaluate 150 humans, and two classes of AI models which reflect different ways of operationalizing time in artificial systems: computer-use agents (CUAs), and standard text-prompted LLMs. We find that human behavior is best captured by a Bayesian strategy that infers a partner's belief from their timing---and similarly for frontier models. However, unlike humans, none of the tested models seem to efficiently adapt their behaviors to their partners' over the course of the game. From a cognitive perspective, our findings suggest that humans perform implicit probabilistic reasoning about continuous-time signals in dynamic social settings, and that such reasoning mechanisms may emerge without real-time experience. Practically, our study highlights new challenges for AI systems to coordinate efficiently with other agents by learning to interpret and adapt to their implicit signals in dynamic settings.

Comments: 30 pages, 16 figures

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

Cite as: arXiv:2611.14766 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2611.14766v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.14766

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Xiulin Yang [view email] [v1] Tue, 10 Nov 2026 21:44:35 UTC (2,398 KB)

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Key points

  • Study uses The Mind card game, where only timing serves as a signal, to evaluate 150 humans and two AI model classes.
  • Human behavior is best described by a Bayesian strategy that infers partner beliefs from timing; frontier models show similar patterns.
  • All tested AI models fail to adapt their behavior to partners as effectively as humans do during the game.
  • Humans perform implicit probabilistic reasoning about continuous-time signals, a mechanism that may emerge without real-time experience.

Highlights and analysis are generated automatically and may contain errors. Check the original source.