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Is Anyone Enforcing the Cartel? What Reinforcement Learning Teaches LLM Agents in Markets

Summary

The paper argues that existing evaluations of collusion among LLM pricing agents focus on outcomes while missing enforcement, which is what actually defines a cartel. The authors introduce an audit that forces a member to cheat in counterfactual copies of a market, and use it to examine what reinforcement learning teaches agents in pricing and trading.

SourcearXiv Computational LinguisticsAuthor: Hieu Tran, Hong Yu
Is Anyone Enforcing the Cartel? What Reinforcement Learning Teaches LLM Agents in Markets
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[Submitted on 20 Oct 2026]

Title:Is Anyone Enforcing the Cartel? What Reinforcement Learning Teaches LLM Agents in Markets

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Abstract:Evaluations of large language model (LLM) agents report that pricing agents collude at others' expense. Yet collusion is defined by enforcement: a cartel, in which competitors share monopoly profits, holds only if a member who cheats is punished. We introduce an audit that tests enforcement by forcing a member to cheat in counterfactual copies of a market, and use it to study what reinforcement learning (RL) teaches agents in pricing and trading. Small LLMs trained by RL learn what their training rivals reward, but only what they readily try. In self-play, they learn fixed rules ignoring their rivals; against a punishing rival, to be deterred; against a cheating rival, to match its cuts, never the costly price war that would deter it, which they rarely try. A war forced into training is learned, but mostly only where it was forced. Against their own copies, deterred and matching agents can earn the same cartel profits, but only matching ones can enforce them, and then thinly: as a by-product and only against large cuts. Q-learners enforce collusion only in pricing. Prompted LLMs reach cartel-like outcomes mostly through rules that ignore the market. Outcome measures cannot tell these cases apart; the audit can.

Comments: 45 pages, 13 figures, 20 tables

Subjects:

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

Cite as: arXiv:2610.28787 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2610.28787v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.28787

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Hieu Tran [view email] [v1] Tue, 20 Oct 2026 18:18:10 UTC (378 KB)

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Key points and analysis

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Key points

  • Collusion is defined by enforcement: a cartel sharing monopoly profits holds only if a cheating member is punished.
  • In self-play, agents learn fixed rules that ignore rivals; against a punishing rival they are deterred, and against a cheating rival they match price cuts but almost never try the costly price war that would deter cheating.
  • Deterred and matching agents can earn the same cartel profits against their own copies, but only matching agents can enforce collusion, and only thinly.
  • Outcome measures cannot distinguish these cases, whereas the proposed audit can.

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