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$M^3$: A Multi-LLM System for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking as a Markov Decision Process

Summary

Researchers introduce $M^3$, an automated red-teaming framework that formalizes multi-turn jailbreaking as a finite-horizon Markov Decision Process. Across two benchmarks and six target models, it improves Attack Success Rates by up to 53% in ASR@5, and even with a lightweight attacker LLM it gains up to 26% in ASR@1 and 34% in ASR@5 over baselines using stronger attackers. It also shows steeper risk escalation over turns and more consistent performance across risk categories without a predefined risk taxonomy.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Yuqing Huang, Jack Ji, Jithin Pradeep, Sagarika Suresh, Jekaterina Novikova
$M^3$: A Multi-LLM System for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking as a Markov Decision Process
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[Submitted on 22 Oct 2026]

Title:$M^3$: A Multi-LLM System for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking as a Markov Decision Process

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Abstract:Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to carefully orchestrated multi-turn interactions that progressively bypass safety mechanisms. However, many existing red-teaming approaches rely on heuristics or impose strong assumptions that limit their applicability in fully black box settings. We address this gap by introducing $M^3$, an automated red-teaming framework that formalizes multi-turn jailbreaking as a finite-horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP). In $M^3$, an attacker LLM interacts with a target LLM while operating over a compact internal state produced by a state LLM. Across two benchmarks and six target models, $M^3$ consistently outperforms state-of-the-art multi-turn red-teaming methods in Attack Success Rates (ASR), achieving improvements of up to 53% in ASR@5. Even with lightweight attacker, $M^3$ attains gains up to 26% in ASR@1 and 34% in ASR@5, compared to baselines that use higher capacity attackers. Beyond improved effectiveness, $M^3$ exhibits steeper risk escalation over conversational turns and achieves more consistent performance across risk categories (up to 4.82 improvement in Gini index) without relying on predefined risk taxonomy, providing a scalable and principled framework for multi-turn red-teaming and safety evaluation.

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

Cite as: arXiv:2610.31937 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.31937v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.31937

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Yuqing Huang [view email] [v1] Thu, 22 Oct 2026 21:35:21 UTC (10,595 KB)

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Key points

  • Formalizes multi-turn jailbreaking as a finite-horizon MDP with an attacker LLM, a state LLM producing a compact internal state, and a target LLM, suited to fully black-box settings.
  • Outperforms state-of-the-art multi-turn red-teaming methods on two benchmarks and six target models, with ASR@5 gains up to 53%.
  • A lightweight attacker still achieves up to 26% ASR@1 and 34% ASR@5 gains over baselines that use higher-capacity attackers.
  • Exhibits steeper risk escalation across conversational turns and up to 4.82 improvement in Gini index across risk categories without relying on a predefined taxonomy.

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