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Causal Foundations of Collective Agency

Summary

This research proposes a causal framework to define and quantify collective agency, i.e., the potential for multiple simple agents to inadvertently form a collective with distinct capabilities and goals. Using causal games and causal abstraction, the authors solve an incentive puzzle in actor-critic models and quantitatively assess collective agency in different voting mechanisms. The framework aims to provide a foundation for understanding, predicting, and controlling emergent collective agents in multi-agent AI systems.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Frederik Hytting J{\o}rgensen, Sebastian Weichwald, Lewis Hammond
Causal Foundations of Collective Agency
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[2605.00248] Causal Foundations of Collective Agency

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Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence

arXiv:2605.00248 (cs)

[Submitted on 30 Apr 2026]

Title:Causal Foundations of Collective Agency

Authors:Frederik Hytting Jørgensen, Sebastian Weichwald, Lewis Hammond

View a PDF of the paper titled Causal Foundations of Collective Agency, by Frederik Hytting J{\o}rgensen and 2 other authors

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Abstract:A key challenge for the safety of advanced AI systems is the possibility that multiple simpler agents might inadvertently form a collective agent with capabilities and goals distinct from those of any individual. More generally, determining when a group of agents can be viewed as a unified collective agent is a foundational question in the study of interactions and incentives in both biological and artificial systems. We adopt a behavioral perspective in answering this question, ascribing collective agency to a group when viewing the group's joint actions as rational and goal-directed successfully predicts its behavior. We formalize this perspective on collective agency using causal games -- which are causal models of strategic, multi-agent interactions -- and causal abstraction -- which formalizes when a simple, high-level model faithfully captures a more complex, low-level model. We use this framework to solve a puzzle regarding multi-agent incentives in actor-critic models and to make quantitative assessments of the degree of collective agency exhibited by different voting mechanisms. Our framework aims to provide a foundation for theoretical and empirical work to understand, predict, and control emergent collective agents in multi-agent AI systems.

Comments: CLeaR 2026

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)

Cite as: arXiv:2605.00248 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2605.00248v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.00248

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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From: Frederik Hytting Jørgensen [view email] [v1] Thu, 30 Apr 2026 21:32:10 UTC (44 KB)

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Key points and analysis

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Key points

  • Collective agency is attributed when a group's joint actions are rational and goal-directed.
  • The framework formalizes collective agency using causal games and causal abstraction.
  • It solves the multi-agent incentive problem in actor-critic models.
  • It quantitatively evaluates collective agency across different voting mechanisms.

Highlights and analysis are generated automatically and may contain errors. Check the original source.