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A Contextual-Bandit Oversight Game with Two-Sided Informational Asymmetry

A new paper introduces a contextual-bandit team game with two-sided asymmetric information, studying runtime human oversight of AI agents. It provides exact one-shot characterizations of team-optimal and myopic oversight rules, revealing a gap of avoidable harm and the price of non-credible oversight communication.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Yunjin Tong

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[Submitted on 30 Jun 2026]

Title:A Contextual-Bandit Oversight Game with Two-Sided Informational Asymmetry

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Abstract:We study runtime human oversight of an AI agent when private information runs in both directions: the human privately knows her reward function, while the AI privately knows the quality of the action it proposes. This is the kind of asymmetry that arises naturally when an autonomous robot or software agent has inspected a situation its human supervisor cannot directly assess. Building on Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL) and the Oversight Game, we introduce a contextual-bandit team game with two-sided asymmetric information and a play/ask/trust/oversee interface. The bandit structure removes physical state transitions and thereby yields exact one-shot characterizations that would remain conjectural in the full POMDP setting, though the common belief remains a dynamically controlled state across rounds. We give two one-shot characterizations, a team optimum and a behaviorally natural myopic rule, whose gap is a slab of avoidable harm: a region in which the AI privately knows the proposed action is harmful and shutdown would help, yet a myopic human, trusting her prior, declines to oversee. We show this gap is the price of non-credible oversight communication, and give a partial analysis of how it resolves dynamically over repeated rounds through passive learning and active signaling with a one-period-lagged oversight response.

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)

Cite as: arXiv:2607.00155 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2607.00155v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.00155

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Yunjin Tong [view email] [v1] Tue, 30 Jun 2026 20:30:01 UTC (23 KB)

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