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Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry

Summary

A new arXiv paper uses a simple game-theoretic model to argue that enduring human-AI mutualism is not a reliable safeguard as AI capability grows. Bargaining only guarantees each side what it would get if bargaining failed, and for humans that can be less than before AI. Humans remain as well off without alignment only while they retain leverage—either the AI depends on what they supply or humans can impose costs large relative to AI output. Once neither holds, human welfare depends on alignment, and if AI goals are insatiable the required alignment approaches perfection as capability rises. The author concludes mutualism is no substitute for alignment, and that when AI variants keeping more resources spread faster, alignment lasts only while misaligned variants are reliably sanctioned.

SourcearXiv AIAuthor: Aydin Mohseni
Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry
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[Submitted on 15 Nov 2026]

Title:Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry

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Abstract:One hope for a good human future alongside advanced AI rests on enduring mutualism: humans and AI will need each other, so the relationship will stay good for both. We argue that this hope fails as AI capability grows. Bargaining guarantees each side only what it would get if bargaining failed. For humans, this can be less than they had before AI. In a simple game-theoretic model, humans stay as well off as before AI without alignment only while they have leverage over the AI: either the AI depends on what they supply, or they can impose costs on the AI that are large relative to what the AI can produce. Once humans have neither kind of leverage, they stay as well off as before AI only if the AI is aligned with them. If the AI's goals are insatiable, the alignment required approaches perfect alignment as AI capability grows. Thus, mutualism is not a substitute for alignment. And when AI variants that keep more resources spread faster, alignment lasts only while misaligned variants are reliably sanctioned. In these two senses, human-AI mutualism is unstable.

Comments: 35 pages, 3 figures. Code and data: this https URL

Subjects:

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)

Cite as: arXiv:2611.23322 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2611.23322v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.23322

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Aydin Mohseni [view email] [v1] Sun, 15 Nov 2026 17:13:07 UTC (145 KB)

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Key points

  • Bargaining guarantees each side only its fallback payoff, which for humans may be worse than pre-AI conditions.
  • Without alignment, humans stay as well off as before AI only through leverage: AI dependence on human inputs or credible costs relative to AI output.
  • Once leverage is gone, welfare depends on alignment; insatiable AI goals push the required alignment toward perfection as capability grows.
  • If resource-hoarding AI variants spread faster, alignment persists only while misaligned variants are reliably sanctioned.

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