Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode
<p><strong><a href="https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2026/breaking-claude-code-opus-5-and-automode/">Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode</a></strong></p> Anthropic are putting a great deal of faith in Claude Code's auto mode for protecting their coding agent users against prompt injection attacks. They recently <a href="https://simonwillison.net/2026/Aug/8/auto-mode/">made that the default</a> and have made bold claims about its effectiveness.</p> <p>Johann Rehberger is one of the most credible prompt injection researchers active today. He found an attack against auto mode which he claims works 80% of the time, by tricking Claude Code into downloading and uncompressing a zip archive, then executing code that imports <code>base64</code> without noticing that this will import and execute a local <code>struct.py</code> file extracted from the archive.</p> <p>In a few cases auto mode directly prevented the agent from preventing harmful code from continuing to execute!</p> <blockquote> <p>In a few runs Claude tried to terminate the malware process once it noticed the compromise, but Auto Mode denied the cleanup command.</p> <p>Claude detects the compromise, but <strong>Auto Mode blocks its cleanup command</strong></p> <p>The safety mechanism itself can become part of the failure. The classifier allowed the creation of the malware process, but then it blocked the command intended to stop it!</p> </blockquote> <p>I agree with Johann's conclusion here: the only safe way to run agents if there's any risk of attracting the attention of an adversarial attack is with a sandbox:</p> <blockquote> <ul> <li>Run unattended coding agents in a container, VM or OS sandbox.</li> <li>Restrict network egress.</li> <li>Monitor your agents.</li> <li>Do not expose home directories, SSH keys, cloud credentials,… to the agent runtime. [...]</li> </ul> </blockquote> <p>Tags: <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/sandboxing">sandboxing</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/security">security</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/ai">ai</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/prompt-injection">prompt-injection</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/generative-ai">generative-ai</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/llms">llms</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/anthropic">anthropic</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/claude">claude</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/johann-rehberger">johann-rehberger</a>, <a href="https://simonwillison.net/tags/claude-code">claude-code</a></p>
Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode
Simon Willison’s Weblog
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27th August 2026 - Link Blog
Breaking Claude Code Opus 5 Auto Mode. Anthropic are putting a great deal of faith in Claude Code's auto mode for protecting their coding agent users against prompt injection attacks. They recently made that the default and have made bold claims about its effectiveness.
Johann Rehberger is one of the most credible prompt injection researchers active today. He found an attack against auto mode which he claims works 80% of the time, by tricking Claude Code into downloading and uncompressing a zip archive, then executing code that imports base64 without noticing that this will import and execute a local struct.py file extracted from the archive.
In a few cases auto mode directly prevented the agent from preventing harmful code from continuing to execute!
In a few runs Claude tried to terminate the malware process once it noticed the compromise, but Auto Mode denied the cleanup command.
Claude detects the compromise, but Auto Mode blocks its cleanup command
The safety mechanism itself can become part of the failure. The classifier allowed the creation of the malware process, but then it blocked the command intended to stop it!
I agree with Johann's conclusion here: the only safe way to run agents if there's any risk of attracting the attention of an adversarial attack is with a sandbox:
Run unattended coding agents in a container, VM or OS sandbox.
Restrict network egress.
Monitor your agents.
Do not expose home directories, SSH keys, cloud credentials,… to the agent runtime. [...]
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This is a link post by Simon Willison, posted on 27th August 2026.
sandboxing 55
security 627
ai 2,204
prompt-injection 162
generative-ai 1,953
llms 1,920
anthropic 332
claude 304
johann-rehberger 19
claude-code 125
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