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翻訳待ち:Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance

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AI サービスが一時的に利用できないため、復旧後に翻訳を補完します。ソース概要:arXiv:2609.16213v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-purpose large language models can retrieve and integrate scientific information, support experimental planning, and computational analysis; biological foundation models can predict, optimize, and generate proteins, genes, and genome-scale sequences; agentic systems can coordinate multistep research tasks; automated laboratories can partially close the design-build-test-learn cycle. These technologies could greatly benefit medicine, public health, and biotechnology. However, their biosecurity risk depends not only on what the AI can do, but also on who uses it, their expertise…

ソースarXiv AI著者: Candace S. Y. Chan, Aris Karatzikos, Ilias Georgakopoulos-Soares
翻訳待ち:Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance
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AI サービスが一時的に利用できないため、復旧後に翻訳を補完します。

[Submitted on 14 Sep 2026] Title:Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance View a PDF of the paper titled Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance, by Candace S.Y. Chan and 2 other authors View PDF Abstract:Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-purpose large language models can retrieve and integrate scientific information, support experimental planning, and computational analysis; biological foundation models can predict, optimize, and generate proteins, genes, and genome-scale sequences; agentic systems can coordinate multistep research tasks; automated laboratories can partially close the design-build-test-learn cycle. These technologies could greatly benefit medicine, public health, and biotechnology. However, their biosecurity risk depends not only on what the AI can do, but also on who uses it, their expertise and intent, their access to laboratory tools and materials, and the safeguards in place. Current evidence shows that AI uplift exists but primarily affects digital rather than physical tasks. Frontier systems have exceeded expert baselines on in-silico, and screening-evasion benchmarks, whereas controlled wet-laboratory studies find that tacit knowledge and physical execution remain substantial barriers. This review describes the different biological threats from AI tool use, from information gathering and biological design to procurement, synthesis, testing, scale-up, and potential release. We further examine why alignment techniques for general-purpose models transfer poorly to biological ones, and the emerging role of interpretability in auditing whether hazardous capabilities are genuinely removed. We argue for defense-in-depth governance that links capability thresholds to proportionate responsibilities across the biological AI ecosystem, reducing high-consequence risk while preserving beneficial use. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2609.16213 [cs.AI] (or arXiv:2609.16213v1 [cs.AI] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.16213 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) Submission history From: Ilias Georgakopoulos-Soares [view email] [v1] Mon, 14 Sep 2026 18:44:00 UTC (1,718 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance, by Candace S.Y. Chan and 2 other authors View PDF view license Current browse context: cs.AI new | recent | 2026-09 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Loading... Data provided by: Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)

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  • AI 生成が一時的に利用できないため、ソース内容とフォールバックメタデータを保存しました。
  • arXiv:2609.16213v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-pur…

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