待翻譯：Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing
AI 服務暫時不可用，以下為來源摘要，待恢復後補全翻譯：arXiv:2608.21423v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic security uses large-language-model (LLM) agents to plan, dispatch, and interpret security tools. As these systems move from demonstrations to deployed products, practitioners repeatedly encounter the same operational failures. We systematize these failures through a hands-on evaluation of ten widely used static, dynamic, cloud, orchestration, and AI red-teaming tools for unattended pipelines. We introduce a four-dimensional Integration Friction Index that separates one-time engineering cost from recurring organisational, legal, and maintenance cost. We then derive quantitative regularities that explain recurring failure modes. Modelling an agentic security system as stochastic LLM policies wrapped by a deterministic mediator, we show that long-lived sessions lose resident evidence with phase count, while short-lived sub-agents extend the usable horizon according to the compression ratio between raw evidence and its summary. We show that a two-stage verdict cascade multiplies scorer likelihood ratios, but provides little benefit when scorer errors correlate. We show that treating unevaluable outcomes as attack failures biases downstream measurements toward evasive and severe responses. We formulate planner-versus-worker model routing as a knapsack problem and derive a closed-form execution cap for heavy-tailed tools, eta* = alpha v/c. Finally, we show why scope and budget enforcement cannot be delegated to system prompts: prompts do not constrain what actually executes. Inspectra, our implemented platform, serves as a worked instantiation, with mechanisms labelled shipped, partial, or planned, including those that did not work.
AI 服務暫時不可用，以下為來源正文，待恢復後補全翻譯。
--> [Submitted on 16 Aug 2026] Title:Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing View a PDF of the paper titled Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing, by Israt Moyeen Noumi and 5 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Agentic security uses large-language-model (LLM) agents to plan, dispatch, and interpret security tools. As these systems move from demonstrations to deployed products, practitioners repeatedly encounter the same operational failures. We systematize these failures through a hands-on evaluation of ten widely used static, dynamic, cloud, orchestration, and AI red-teaming tools for unattended pipelines. We introduce a four-dimensional Integration Friction Index that separates one-time engineering cost from recurring organisational, legal, and maintenance cost. We then derive quantitative regularities that explain recurring failure modes. Modelling an agentic security system as stochastic LLM policies wrapped by a deterministic mediator, we show that long-lived sessions lose resident evidence with phase count, while short-lived sub-agents extend the usable horizon according to the compression ratio between raw evidence and its summary. We show that a two-stage verdict cascade multiplies scorer likelihood ratios, but provides little benefit when scorer errors correlate. We show that treating unevaluable outcomes as attack failures biases downstream measurements toward evasive and severe responses. We formulate planner-versus-worker model routing as a knapsack problem and derive a closed-form execution cap for heavy-tailed tools, eta* = alpha v/c. Finally, we show why scope and budget enforcement cannot be delegated to system prompts: prompts do not constrain what actually executes. Inspectra, our implemented platform, serves as a worked instantiation, with mechanisms labelled shipped, partial, or planned, including those that did not work. Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) Cite as: arXiv:2608.21423 [cs.CL] (or arXiv:2608.21423v1 [cs.CL] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.21423 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Mehedi Hasan Nipu [view email] [v1] Sun, 16 Aug 2026 07:18:04 UTC (825 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing, by Israt Moyeen Noumi and 5 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.CL new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CR cs.MA References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Loading... Data provided by: Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)