跳到主要內容
AI News HubLIVE
來源內容 · 翻譯待補全2 分鐘閱讀

待翻譯:smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript

文章摘要

AI 服務暫時不可用,以下為來源摘要,待恢復後補全翻譯: Research: smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript I tasked Claude Fable 5 running in Claude Code for web with the following research task: Put https://smolmachines.com through its paces as a fast secure sandbox. Explore what it would take to use this to run untrusted Python and JavaScript code in a way that is limited in what RAM and CPU time it can take up (protection against "while true") with no network access and filesystem access only to designated files Goal is to be able to use this to execute user-provided tasks for things like data transformations It quickly ran into a problem: the Claude Code for web environment can't run smol machines. Quoting the notes it wrote: This Claude Code container: Linux 6.18.5-fc-v20 (itself a…

待翻譯:smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript
回報錯誤

更正管道尚未開通,可先複製下方文章資訊留存。

查看更正說明
直接讀正文

AI 服務暫時不可用,以下為來源正文,待恢復後補全翻譯。

Research: smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript Simon Willison’s Weblog Subscribe 19th August 2026 Research smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript — Testing smolvm 1.8.3 shows it is well suited for sandboxing untrusted Python and JavaScript data transformations using hardware-isolated VMs rather than shared-kernel containers. Offline local images, no-network execution, CPU/RAM limits, guest-enforced timeouts, storage quotas, read-only input mounts, writable output mounts, and --unprivileged all worked as intended, with cold starts around 0.6–1.5 seconds and warm executions around 50 ms. I tasked Claude Fable 5 running in Claude Code for web with the following research task: Put https://smolmachines.com through its paces as a fast secure sandbox. Explore what it would take to use this to run untrusted Python and JavaScript code in a way that is limited in what RAM and CPU time it can take up (protection against "while true") with no network access and filesystem access only to designated files Goal is to be able to use this to execute user-provided tasks for things like data transformations It quickly ran into a problem: the Claude Code for web environment can't run smol machines. Quoting the notes it wrote: This Claude Code container: Linux 6.18.5-fc-v20 (itself a Firecracker guest), 4 vCPU, 15GB RAM. No /dev/kvm, no vmx/svm CPU flags → no nested virt. smolvm machine run fails as expected: "kvm not available". Plan B: GitHub Actions ubuntu runners DO expose /dev/kvm → run the real test battery via a temporary workflow on this branch, collect logs, remove workflow in final commit. And Plan B is what it did, installing smolvm and running these tests directly in a GitHub Actions runner against that branch. That was a creative solution to the environmental limits posed by Claude Code for web. Another example of Fable being relentlessly proactive. Recent articles Conceptual integrity and counting lines of code - 19th August 2026 Qwen 3.8 27B is excellent, but it defaults to wildly overthinking things - 16th August 2026 Now we have a timeline of the OpenAI accidental attack against Hugging Face - 7th August 2026 This is a beat by Simon Willison, posted on 19th August 2026. research 11 sandboxing 54 ai 2,194 github-actions 70 generative-ai 1,943 llms 1,910 claude-mythos-fable 36 Monthly briefing Sponsor me for $10/month and get a curated email digest of the month's most important LLM developments. Pay me to send you less! Sponsor & subscribe Disclosures Colophon © 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026

展開要點與分析

文章情報

工程師進階

要點

  • AI 服務暫時不可用,系統已先保留來源內容與降級後設資料。
  • Research: smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python…

技術影響

可能影響 Agent 架構、工具呼叫、工作流自動化和產品整合。

要點與分析由自動化流程生成,可能有誤,請結合原始來源核實。