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待翻译:smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript

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AI 服务暂时不可用,以下为来源摘要,待恢复后补全翻译: Research: smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript I tasked Claude Fable 5 running in Claude Code for web with the following research task: Put https://smolmachines.com through its paces as a fast secure sandbox. Explore what it would take to use this to run untrusted Python and JavaScript code in a way that is limited in what RAM and CPU time it can take up (protection against "while true") with no network access and filesystem access only to designated files Goal is to be able to use this to execute user-provided tasks for things like data transformations It quickly ran into a problem: the Claude Code for web environment can't run smol machines. Quoting the notes it wrote: This Claude Code container: Linux 6.18.5-fc-v20 (itself a…

待翻译:smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript
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Research: smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript Simon Willison’s Weblog Subscribe 19th August 2026 Research smolmachines / smolvm as a sandbox for untrusted Python & JavaScript — Testing smolvm 1.8.3 shows it is well suited for sandboxing untrusted Python and JavaScript data transformations using hardware-isolated VMs rather than shared-kernel containers. Offline local images, no-network execution, CPU/RAM limits, guest-enforced timeouts, storage quotas, read-only input mounts, writable output mounts, and --unprivileged all worked as intended, with cold starts around 0.6–1.5 seconds and warm executions around 50 ms. I tasked Claude Fable 5 running in Claude Code for web with the following research task: Put https://smolmachines.com through its paces as a fast secure sandbox. Explore what it would take to use this to run untrusted Python and JavaScript code in a way that is limited in what RAM and CPU time it can take up (protection against "while true") with no network access and filesystem access only to designated files Goal is to be able to use this to execute user-provided tasks for things like data transformations It quickly ran into a problem: the Claude Code for web environment can't run smol machines. Quoting the notes it wrote: This Claude Code container: Linux 6.18.5-fc-v20 (itself a Firecracker guest), 4 vCPU, 15GB RAM. No /dev/kvm, no vmx/svm CPU flags → no nested virt. smolvm machine run fails as expected: "kvm not available". Plan B: GitHub Actions ubuntu runners DO expose /dev/kvm → run the real test battery via a temporary workflow on this branch, collect logs, remove workflow in final commit. And Plan B is what it did, installing smolvm and running these tests directly in a GitHub Actions runner against that branch. That was a creative solution to the environmental limits posed by Claude Code for web. Another example of Fable being relentlessly proactive. Recent articles Conceptual integrity and counting lines of code - 19th August 2026 Qwen 3.8 27B is excellent, but it defaults to wildly overthinking things - 16th August 2026 Now we have a timeline of the OpenAI accidental attack against Hugging Face - 7th August 2026 This is a beat by Simon Willison, posted on 19th August 2026. research 11 sandboxing 54 ai 2,194 github-actions 70 generative-ai 1,943 llms 1,910 claude-mythos-fable 36 Monthly briefing Sponsor me for $10/month and get a curated email digest of the month's most important LLM developments. Pay me to send you less! Sponsor & subscribe Disclosures Colophon © 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026

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