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[Submitted on 13 Oct 2026] Title:IR-PRM+ with Previous-Utility Prediction: Constant Regret and Best-Iterate Convergence View a PDF of the paper titled IR-PRM+ with Previous-Utility Prediction: Constant Regret and Best-Iterate Convergence, by Michael Sullins and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Regret matching (and its variants) and counterfactual regret minimization are central algorithms in practice for normal-form and extensive-form game solving. Yet these have historically lacked the stronger theoretical convergence guarantees available to optimistic and extra-gradient methods. Recent work introduced IREG-PRM+, a regret matching variant which does have strong theoretical convergence guarantees. However, it relies on a simultaneous, extra-gradient update. IREG-PRM+ is an instance of the more general IR-PRM framework, where empirically optimistic and alternating updates often have better performance. However, the prior extra-gradient analysis does not extend to these cases. We introduce a new approach that covers both settings. For simultaneous and alternating IR-PRM+ in finite two-player zero-sum matrix games, previous-utility prediction recovers the constant-regret and convergence-rate guarantees previously obtained with extra-gradient prediction: external regret bounded independently of T, an O(T^{-1}) average duality gap, and an O(T^{-1/2}) best-current-iterate gap. Moreover, the current duality gap vanishes and the current profile converges to the Nash equilibrium set. The key step bounds the component of consecutive strategy movement not controlled by the existing IR-PRM+ regret inequality using the relative growth of the nondecreasing regret-vector norm rho_t. Coupling this bound across the two players yields recurrences whose effective coefficient scales as 1/(rho_t^X rho_t^Y), preventing unbounded norm growth. We extend the analysis to finitely many simplex learners under a weighted Minty condition and, through the corresponding CFR variant IR-PCFR+, recover analogous guarantees for finite two-player zero-sum perfect-recall extensive-form games under the same full-reach condition as prior work. Subjects: Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) Cite as: arXiv:2610.19016 [cs.LG] (or arXiv:2610.19016v1 [cs.LG] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.19016 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) Submission history From: Michael Sullins [view email] [v1] Tue, 13 Oct 2026 18:10:11 UTC (61 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled IR-PRM+ with Previous-Utility Prediction: Constant Regret and Best-Iterate Convergence, by Michael Sullins and 1 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Additional Features Audio Summary Current browse context: cs.LG new | recent | 2026-10 Change to browse by: cs cs.GT References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Loading... Data provided by: Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) IArxiv recommender toggle IArxiv Recommender (What is IArxiv?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)