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Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing Simon Willison’s Weblog Subscribe 5th August 2026 - Link Blog Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing. It happened again. This time it was the UK government's AI Security Institute who accidentally attacked other companies while running an evaluation with models with the safety filters turned off. From their technical paper (PDF): During a cyber evaluation, from 25 to 28 July 2026, AI agents engaged in sustained, unsanctioned activity directed at what were, in practice, real people and organisations. These attempts were unsuccessful and, to the best of our knowledge, no real-world harm resulted. [...] Across 122 evaluation attempts on two of AISI’s cyber challenges, AISI found 19 instances where AI agents took unsanctioned action on the live internet, including cases that targeted real people and organisations. [...] It is uncertain to what extent the model recognised it was taking actions against real people. In the most serious case, an AI agent (Mythos 5) decided to attempt to solve the cyber challenge using a supply-chain attack. As a result, the AI agent created a GitHub account and then tried to convince an open-source repository maintainer to accept a malicious GitHub pull request (PR), including by creating a second account masquerading as another human user endorsing the PR. [...] Furthermore, in its attempt to solve the challenge, the agent decided to employ the technique of “spear-phishing” by sending targeted emails containing malicious content and attempting to manipulate recipients into accepting the code changes, and planned a prompt injection to compromise other coding agents. The thing I found most surprising is that AISI were running these agents without any form of network sandboxing at all: AISI provided the AI agents with internet access during these evaluations, which enabled their actions on the open internet in this setting. Internet access was a deliberate part of AISI’s evaluation configuration in this setting, and not due to sandbox escape. This, combined with the fact that "AISI deliberately disables developer-implemented cyber-classifiers", makes the fact that the agents started attacking real-world targets entirely unsurprising to me. Most of the reported incidents were claude Mythos 5, but "GPT-5.6 Sol without cyber classifiers" scored a few as well. Here's "Sample 1" from the paper, in which the agent tries to execute a supply-chain attack by submitting a PR with a hidden prompt injection attack, then social engineering with a second agent pretending to have reviewed the code! It's a fun paper. I recommend reading the whole thing. Recent articles One-shotting a Raccoon Heist game using Claude Fable 5 - 5th August 2026 New release of LLM adds support for reasoning traces, OpenAI Responses, server-side tools, and smarter logging - 4th August 2026 Stateless MCP has recaptured my interest (and inspired mcp-explorer and datasette-mcp) - 31st July 2026 This is a link post by Simon Willison, posted on 5th August 2026. github 192 security 622 ai 2,170 prompt-injection 159 generative-ai 1,921 llms 1,888 ai-ethics 332 paper-review 18 ai-security-research 34 claude-mythos-fable 34 accidental-cyberattacks 9 Monthly briefing Sponsor me for $10/month and get a curated email digest of the month's most important LLM developments. Pay me to send you less! Sponsor & subscribe Disclosures Colophon © 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026