待翻译：Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems

AI 服务暂时不可用，以下为来源正文，待恢复后补全翻译。

--> [Submitted on 24 Jul 2026] Title:Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems View a PDF of the paper titled Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems, by Mojtaba Eslami View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast. Both can be inefficient because token cost, latency, redundancy, and error propagation increase with the number of active agents and communication links. We model agent selection and communication as a cooperative game with task-conditioned net utility $U(C\mid x)=V(C\mid x)-\sum_{i\in C}c_i$, separating coalition-level costs from agent activation costs. We propose a marginal-value activation rule and greedy router, extend the model to optimize communication edges with per-edge costs, and use estimated Shapley values to predict which agents are worth contacting before and during execution. We connect the problem to submodular maximization and prove two limited guarantees: a curvature-refined bound for a monotone, cardinality-constrained special case, and a tight $1/2$-approximation, with a correction for signed objectives, for an unconstrained non-monotone case via double greedy. Neither guarantee applies directly to the main router, which remains a heuristic. We also prove a Shapley-submodularity sandwich bound linking the error of marginal-value routing to a per-agent diminishing-returns quantity. In synthetic experiments, greedy routing achieves $99.5%$ of brute-force-optimal utility while activating $1.96$ of $8$ agents on average, compared with $38.8%$ for full broadcast. Performance is robust to activation cost and redundancy weight but falls to $66%$ under strong violations of submodularity or noisy value estimates. We distinguish the framework from Shapley pricing, hedonic coalition formation, and communication-graph pruning, and propose evaluation on real multi-agent LLM benchmarks. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) Cite as: arXiv:2608.07532 [cs.AI] (or arXiv:2608.07532v1 [cs.AI] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.07532 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Mojtaba Eslami [view email] [v1] Fri, 24 Jul 2026 19:25:21 UTC (27 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Dynamic Coalition Formation and Communication Pricing in Skill-Based Agentic AI Systems, by Mojtaba Eslami View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.AI new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG econ econ.TH References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Loading... Data provided by: Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate (What is Replicate?) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs. Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)